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Designing The European Economic And Monetary Union 
The introduction of the euro was a leap forward in European integration. Today, 
more than 320 million European citizens share the same currency and enjoy its bene-
fits. On  January 1st, 1999 eleven European countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain) 
irrevocably fixed their bilateral exchange rates. At that moment the euro came into ex-
istence for all cashless transactions, while national notes and coins remained in circu-
lation. It was only 3 years later that, after thorough practical preparations, the euro 
notes and coins were introduced, replacing the national currencies. Since 1999 more 
countries in the European Union fulfilled the Maastricht criteria and introduced the 
euro: Greece in 2001, Slovenia in 2007, Cyprus and Malta in 2008 and Slovakia at the 
beginning of 2009. 
The Economic and Monetary Union is the response to macroeconomic instabil-
ity in the past. The economic turbulences of the 1970s and 1980s inspired Europeans 
to look for ways to ensure macroeconomic stability through closer cooperation in 
Europe. The decision to achieve full monetary integration through the creation of an 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) with its own single currency was enshrined in 
the Treaty on the European Union (also called Maastricht Treaty) in 1991. The Treaty 
set out the ground rules for the introduction of the euro. The road to the euro was di-
vided into three stages, each with its own goals: 
 Stage I (till the end of 1993): completing the internal market in particular by remov-
ing the remaining restrictions on the free movement of capital; 
 Stage II (1994-1999): preparing for the establishment of the European Central 
Bank (ECB) and strengthening efforts towards economic convergence; 
 Stage III (1999 onwards): irrevocably fixing the exchange rates and launching of 
the euro. 
Economic convergence started already before the euro. To introduce the euro, EU 
Member States were required to meet a number of criteria (the so called Maastricht 
criteria) to ensure a high degree of nominal convergence. Specifically, they concern: 
 Price stability – inflation cannot exceed by more than 1.5 percentage points that of 
the three best performing member states in terms of price stability; 
 Sustainability of the government financial position – budget deficit should not ex-
ceed 3% and government debt not 60% of GDP; 
 Exchange rate stability – the exchange rate has to stay within agreed fluctuation 
margins for at least two years before the introduction of the euro; 
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 Durability of convergence – measured by long-term 
interest rates which should not exceed by more than 
2 percentage points those of the three countries with 
the best performance in terms of price stability. 
The Maastricht criteria were instrumental in fostering con-
vergence in the run-up to the euro. The prospects of the 
euro served as a significant incentive for Member States 
to enact reforms and triggered remarkable efforts towards 
achieving macroeconomic stability, particularly with re-
spect to fiscal consolidation. 
With the creation of EMU a unique stability-oriented 
policy framework was established. The single currency 
is the central part of Economic and Monetary Union, 
which is an overarching economic framework designed to 
bring macroeconomic stability and to create the founda-
tions for sustainable economic growth in Europe. At the 
same time, the euro is a natural complement to the Single 
Market, where persons, goods, capital and services flow 
undisrupted between member states. 
The European Central Bank (ECB) has been estab-
lished as the single central bank for all euro-area 
countries. The ECB's primary objective is to ensure price 
stability in the euro-area, based on the conviction that 
price stability is a necessary condition for achieving long-
term growth. Decisions on policy interest rates are taken 
by the ECB's Governing Council, which comprises the 
governors of the euro-area national central banks and the 
members of the ECB's Executive Board. Monetary policy 
decisions taken by the Governing Council are then imple-
mented by the national central banks, which together with 
the ECB form the European System of Central Banks 
(ESCB). 
Member states coordinate their fiscal policies in the 
framework defined by the Treaty and the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP). Sound fiscal policy has always been 
considered crucial for a smooth functioning of EMU where 
the conduct of fiscal policy remains under the responsibil-
ity of member states while monetary policy is centralised 
and independent. The Treaty and the SGP provide a rule-
based framework for the coordination of national fiscal 
policies. This framework is based on the constant moni-
toring of fiscal developments in Member States against 
agreed benchmarks. The European Commission has a 
key role in the fiscal surveillance but Member States' atti-
tude and peer support are equally important. 
Structural policies are coordinated in the context of 
the Lisbon Strategy for jobs and growth. Well-
functioning product, labour and capital markets have an 
important role to play in raising growth potential and in 
cushioning the impact of economic shocks. In 2000, Euro-
pean Union leaders set out the so-called Lisbon strategy 
as a framework for fostering and coordinating structural 
reforms in the EU. Monetary and exchange rate policy in 
a monetary union can no longer play an adjustment role 
for individual countries. Therefore, more emphasis needs 
to be placed on market mechanisms to adjust. Euro-area 
countries have thus a special stake and common interest 
in advancing structural reforms in every member state. 
A Successful First Decade 
Initial expectations were cautious. The unprecedented 
nature of EMU implied a high degree of uncertainty with 
regard to its future functioning. Academics and policy 
makers raised questions primarily about the ability of the 
single monetary policy to deal with country-specific 
shocks. Although alternative adjustment mechanisms 
could in theory take over, they were deemed relatively 
weak in Europe (wage and price flexibility, migration) or 
undesirable (fiscal transfers). Fears of fiscal profligacy 
leading to an unbalanced policy mix were widespread. 
Ten years after its start there is a broad consensus 
about the euro’s success. Most of the pessimistic ex-
pectations did not materialize. The single currency has 
become a symbol of European unity. It has boosted inte-
gration and secured macroeconomic stability. On January 
1st, 2009 Slovakia became the 16th country in the euro –
area, thus confirming the appeal of the single currency 
even in the hard times of global financial crisis. 
The primary goal of macroeconomic stability has 
been fully achieved. Prices and interest rates have con-
verged to lower levels and have stabilised within the euro 
-area (see table 1 and chart 1). The ECB has achieved 
low inflation, on average, and well-anchored inflation ex-
pectations and acquired a high degree of credibility in a 
rather short period of time. This is particularly noteworthy 
given that only ten years ago it was a new institution with-
out a track record. Fiscal coordination within the SGP has 
resulted in significant achievements (see chart 2). Fiscal 
deficits have fallen to record-low levels (only 0.6% of 
GDP in 2007), and the pro-cyclical behaviour of public 
finances has been reduced. It has not been all plain sail-
ing, however. Deficits increased in the beginning of 
2000s, calling into question the efficiency of the coordina-
tion mechanisms. The reform of the SGP in 2005 built on 
the experiences of the first years of EMU and has visibly 
improved the coordination of fiscal policies. Last but not 
least, currency turmoil within the euro-area – a regular 
feature during previous decades whenever there was a 
crisis somewhere in the world – is no longer possible. 
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Job creation has surged but growth has not picked 
up. 16 million jobs have been created in the last decade, 
outpacing other mature economies with generally more 
favourable demographics, including the USA. However, 
productivity growth remained disappointing and offset the 
potential impact of higher employment on output. As a 
consequence, growth, at little more than 2% per annum, 
has remained broadly unchanged compared to the previ-
ous decade, although matched that of the USA in per 
capita terms. 
Trade flows increased and product market integration 
progressed.  The elimination of exchange-rate risk and 
the disappearance of the associated costs have resulted 
in increased trade flows within the euro-area and also 
with other countries. The existence of the euro has proba-
bly encouraged more firms to sell their goods abroad, 
increasing the availability of more products on the market 
and hence consumers' choice and utility. This effect has 
been particularly visible for intra-industry trade, thus re-
ducing the impact of asymmetric shocks in the euro-area. 
Moreover, with growing trade, competition has increased 
and prices have been reduced in the euro-area. The vola-
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Macroeconomic performance indicators
Period averages
Euro area Denmark, Sweden, UK  United States
1989-1998 1999-2008 1989-1998 1999-2008 1989-1998 1999-2008
Real GDP % rate of change 2,2 2,1 2,0 2,7 3,0 2,6
Real GDP per capita % rate of change 1,9 1,6 1,7 2,2 1,8 1,6
Real GDP per capita index, US = 100 73 72 74 76 100 100
Employment % rate of change 0,6 1,3 0,1 0,9 1,5 1,0
Labour productivity % rate of change 1,6 0,8 1,9 1,8 1,5 1,6
Unemployment % of labour force 9,3 8,3 7,9 5,2 5,8 5,0
Inflation % 3,3 2,2 3,4 1,7 3,3 2,8
Fiscal balance % of GDP -4,3 -1,7 -3,6 -0,9 -3,3 -2,5
Gross public debt % of GDP 68,6 68,6 48,7 43,0 67,8 60,7
Long term interest rate % 8,1 4,4 8,6 4,9 7,1 4,8
Real long term interest rate % 4,7 2,4 4,2 3,3 4,3 2,4
Source: European Commission, OECD
Chart 1 
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tility of export prices has fallen and the increased price 
transparency reduced the scope for price discrimination 
between national markets. 
The euro has acted as a powerful catalyst for finan-
cial market integration. Interbank money markets in the 
euro-area have fully integrated, while cross-border inter-
bank transactions have expanded steadily since 1999. 
Cross-border consolidation among banks has acceler-
ated. A significant market in euro-denominated private-
sector bonds has emerged and equity markets’ integra-
tion has progressed faster than outside the euro-area. 
More integrated financial markets have encouraged more 
efficient allocation of resources and generated greater 
opportunities for risk sharing, diversification and greater 
resilience to shocks. 
The euro has emerged as an important international 
currency. Although fostering the international status of 
the euro has never been a goal of the euro-area authori-
ties, the euro has rather quickly established itself as the 
second most important international currency in the world 
behind the US dollar. The euro provides the possibility for 
international public and private investors to diversify their 
asset allocation, and for borrowers to diversify their 
sources of funding. 
In its international role the euro has surpassed the 
combined status of its legacy currencies 10 years 
ago (see table 2). The share of the euro in global foreign 
exchange reserves has been rising since 1999 and 
stands at more than a quarter of all reserves today (see 
chart 3). In global foreign exchange markets, the euro-
dollar currency pair is the most actively traded one, ac-
counting for more than one-quarter of global turnover. In 
debt securities markets, the amount of outstanding euro-
denominated international debt securities has surpassed 
that of the US dollar, with the euro accounting for almost 
a third of the world's stock of international debt securities. 
The single European currency is also widely used for in-
voicing in foreign trade. The process of the internationali-
sation of the euro is ongoing and the euro continues to 
consolidate its position. 
The internationalisation of the euro is characterised 
by a strong regional and institutional pattern. With the 
exception of some functions (notably its use as an inter-
national financing currency), the international use of the 
euro is concentrated in countries neighbouring the euro -
area, in other countries with special economic and politi-
cal  links to the EU, and in transactions directly involving 
euro-area economic agents. At the global level the US 
dollar remains the most important international currency 
in many areas – partly because of inertia and network 
effects that create a bias in favour of the incumbent inter-
EU Centre Policy Brief 
Table 2 5  
 
national currency – but its dominance has declined. Over 
time, the world economy is likely to move towards a multi-
polar currency system centred around the US dollar, the 
euro and one or two Asian currencies. The euro would 
therefore not replace the US dollar; but the US dollar 
would no longer be the single dominant currency in the 
global monetary system. 
The euro has become a valuable public good. The 
past decade has seen the emergence of new players in 
the global economy and the international financial system 
has become increasingly multi-polar in nature. The euro-
area and the euro are playing an increasingly important 
role in supporting the stability of the world economy and 
the global financial system (see table 3). To some extent, 
the intra euro-area stabilization has also reduced volatility 
in the world economy. Moreover, non-EU countries in-
creasingly perceive the euro-area (and the EU as a 
whole) as a pole of stability, a source of new capital, and 
also a reference of advice and expertise on integration 
and regulatory approaches. 
Challenging Times Ahead 
The success of the euro was helped by the benign 
economic environment across the globe. The years up 
to 2007 saw very supportive financial conditions in the 
world economy. Globalization helped to contain inflation-
ary pressures, and asset booms contributed to fiscal 
windfalls. The benign decade came to an abrupt end with 
the onset of the international financial crisis. 
The ongoing crisis exposes imbalances within the 
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euro-area. Easy access to foreign capital has led to mis-
allocation of resources and macroeconomic imbalances 
in some euro-area countries in recent years (see chart 4). 
Money was flowing to property markets, fuelling excess 
construction activity and housing bubbles. An adjustment 
channel to correct competitiveness differences exists in 
the euro-area (in principle like in any other currency area) 
but works only very slowly. Therefore, rising indebtedness 
and falling competitiveness in overheating economies led 
to large external deficits in some countries. The long-
postponed adjustment, triggered by the current re-pricing 
of risks, might be costly and will pose particular policy 
challenges in coming years. 
The euro offers important protection to its member 
states in times of crisis. In the past, before the introduc-
tion of the euro, global currency turmoil frequently led to 
intra-European exchange rate fluctuations that were often 
ports the credibility of the fiscal stimulus and can also 
help to safeguard the fiscal sustainability after the 
stimulus has played its role. 
Last but not least, the single central bank makes it easier 
to coordinate any emergency measures among the Mem-
ber States and to intervene in the troubled money market. 
From an international perspective, with the single Euro-
pean Central Bank, concerted monetary actions have 
become much easier in times of stress. 
Nevertheless, the crisis raises major challenges. In 
the short term, a pressing necessity is to support the 
banking systems in the member states in a coordinated 
way.  The actions taken at the EU level have already bore 
some fruit and prevented a systemic financial meltdown. 
However, the banking system is still ailing, yet its func-
tioning is crucial for the effectiveness of monetary and 
fiscal policy. Additionally, in view of the gloomy economic 
forecasts, another short-term challenge for the euro-area 
authorities was to provide the necessary macroeconomic 
stimulus to avoid a severe recession; relevant decisions 
have been taken in most member states. Although the 
single monetary policy removes the burden of monetary 
coordination, on the fiscal front coordination is crucial in 
order to internalise cross-border spillovers and avoid free-
riding. 
It is not too early to think beyond the crisis. First, it is 
imperative to ensure that short-term crisis measures will 
not endanger the hard-won gains of macroeconomic sta-
bility in the long term. Therefore, monetary and fiscal im-
pulses will need to be reversed after serving their pur-
pose. Applied with the flexibility foreseen for such circum-
stances, the SGP remains the cornerstone of the EU fis-
cal framework also during the crisis, thus providing cer-
tainty about the future conduct of fiscal policies and sup-
porting private sector confidence. Second, times of crisis 
often serve as a trigger of bold reforms. This opportunity 
should not be wasted. The crisis makes a good case for 
stepping up the integration of financial markets and for 
determined implementation of the EU regulatory and su-
pervisory arrangements. 
The rising international status of the euro carries new 
risks and responsibilities for the euro-area. It raises 
the exposure of the euro-area – including its financial sys-
tem – to shocks originating in other parts of the world and 
to disruptive portfolio shifts between key international cur-
rencies. And it is precisely such shocks that are likely to 
occur more frequently in a world characterized by finan-
cial and economic globalization. The current financial tur-
moil provides a compelling argument for a better monitor-
ing of risk and a better enforcement of global responsibil-
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Chart 4 
costly in terms of growth. From a more general perspec-
tive, the single currency underpins the Single Market and 
prevents Member States from sliding back into protection-
ism, as is often the case in times of crisis, with negative 
implications for recovery. The Single Market and the euro 
make spillovers more tangible and motivate coordination 
of national rescue packages. Moreover, the macroeco-
nomic policy stimulus is likely to be more effective in EMU 
than it would have been without the euro: 
 the single currency removes the offsetting exchange-
rate movements that would have appeared in case of 
heterogeneous national stimuli in a world without the 
euro; 
 the common fiscal framework, based on the Stability 
and Growth Pact, has two valuable features: it sup-7  
 
ity. To effectively meet the responsibility stemming from 
its position in the world economy, the euro-area must be 
able to speak in a more assertive and coherent manner in 
the international financial institutions and fora. The cur-
rent attempt to reform the global economic governance is 
a good opportunity to streamline and consolidate the euro
-area’s external representation. 
Some Lessons For Regional Integration In Asia 
Economic and monetary integration in Europe can 
serve as a good point of reference for regional inte-
gration in Asia. The lessons that can be drawn from the 
process of European integration are of two types: (i) les-
sons related to the European reserve and exchange rate 
arrangements of the past, which have some similarities 
with East Asian arrangements currently being imple-
mented or under consideration; and (ii) lessons related to 
decision-making and governance. 
Major differences must be taken into account. Both 
politics and economics differ across the two regions – 
apart from culture, traditions and geographical conditions. 
The geopolitical context in the period when the European 
Union was built is also very different from current times, in 
which East Asia is trying to boost its economic and politi-
cal links. Integration in Europe has been a step-by-step 
process which started in the 1950s with the pooling of 
sovereignty in the coal and steel industries and, almost 
60 years later, it is still advancing. 
The question about the types of currency reserve ar-
rangements and monetary cooperation in Asia is a 
complex one. Three options, which could also be part of 
an evolutionary process, seem to emerge in the Asian 
context: (i) bilateral swap arrangements, (ii) the multilater-
alisation of such arrangements, and (iii) exchange rate 
and monetary coordination, possibly evolving towards a 
monetary union. Up to now, the value added of the bilat-
eral swap arrangements under the Chiang Mai Initiative 
has been limited because it has never been used and 
because the amount of bilateral arrangements (raised to 
120 billion US dollars in February 2009) seems relatively 
small compared to the amount of reserves (USD 3.22 
trillion) available in the region. Over time, the emergence 
of a regional forum for policy dialogue on monetary and 
financial issues and for multilateral surveillance – proba-
bly a pre-condition for the active use of the Chiang Mai 
Initiative - will be important. The ASEAN+3 decision to 
multilateralise the swap arrangements under the Chiang 
Mai Initiative may well give new momentum to the inte-
gration process and could put in place an effective 
mechanism to provide help in case of currency turmoil or 
liquidity needs. 
The integration process in Asia has been mainly mar-
ket-driven but it will profit from clear cooperative pro-
cedures. The European integration has been more insti-
tution-based compared to the Asian integration process 
so far. However, even a more market-driven monetary 
unification process requires effective surveillance. The 
European lesson in this respect is clear: mutual surveil-
lance works and is effective, especially if it is backed by 
clear procedures carried through by independent regional 
institutions. It can evolve over time from simple peer re-
view to structured forms of monitoring with specific rules 
and possible sanctions (as in the case of the SGP). What-
ever its nature, some form of policy surveillance remains 
the most important precondition to advance exchange-
rate and monetary policy coordination, and to make pro-
gress towards, perhaps one day, an Asian monetary un-
ion. 
Political will is necessary to move forward. In Asia, up 
to now, the commitment of the political leadership to pool 
some of the national sovereignty seems to be weak and 
effective surveillance mechanisms are not yet in place. 
This is the most important challenge for economic and 
monetary coordination in East Asia. With the political 
commitment to regional surveillance and to the creation of 
some form of institution able to enforce it, monetary and 
exchange rate coordination could work well and economic 
integration could advance faster. 
Conclusion 
The current global economic crisis is a challenge for 
Europe and Asia but also provides new opportunities. 
The macroeconomic stability brought about by the Eco-
nomic and Monetary Union and the euro now offers an 
important protection for the members of the euro-area. 
Nevertheless, the crisis, with its wide-ranging impact, has 
exposed internal challenges and global interdependen-
cies, which call for truly global cooperation. To resolve the 
crisis, both regional and global coordination should pro-
gress while taking into account the changing economic 
weights in the global economy. With its established mac-
roeconomic stability and the growing international role of 
the euro, there is scope for the euro-area to assume a 
more prominent role in shaping the reform of the global 
economic architecture. In the same vain, the G-20 proc-
ess, where Asia is represented with five countries, pro-
vides an opportunity for Asian countries to play a much 
more important role in global economic decision-making. 
But to play a productive role in international fora, Asian 
countries need to develop capacities and coordination 
mechanisms to be able to provide input and to speak with 
one voice. In this context, Asia could benefit from looking 
at the long European experience with economic integra-
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The Long Road To EMU  
 
Economic and monetary union was a recurring European goal from the late 1960s on-
wards. The general instability on international currency markets characteristic of the late 
1960s put in danger the stability of the then European Economic Community. In response 
to these turbulences, in 1969 European leaders decided to form a high-level group led by 
Pierre Werner, the Luxembourg Prime Minister, to report on how economic and monetary 
union could be achieved. 
The Werner group submitted its report in 1970, setting out a three-stage process to 
achieve EMU within a ten-year period. The report called for closer economic policy coor-
dination, with interest rates and management of reserves decided at Community level, as 
well as agreed frameworks for national budgetary policies. The launch of the Werner plan 
was interrupted by a new wave of currency instability on international markets after the 
break-down of the Bretton Woods system, the first wave of oil price increases, and a lack 
of economic policy convergence in Europe. 
A new proposal for EMU was put forward in 1977 by the then president of the European 
Commission, Roy Jenkins. It was taken up in a more limited form when the European 
Monetary System (EMS) was launched in March 1979. 
The EMS was based on fixed but adjustable exchange rates defined in relation to the 
newly created European Currency Unit (ECU) – a currency basket composed of EMS 
currencies. Within the EMS, currency fluctuations were controlled through an Exchange 
Rate Mechanism (ERM) and kept within predetermined fluctuation limits. The EMS con-
stituted an important pooling of monetary sovereignty because any changes in central 
parities of exchange rates in the system needed approval by all participating Member 
States. Over time, the mechanism helped to achieve a relatively high degree of conver-
gence in economic policies and in economic results, and thus exchange rate stability. 
This was helped by a policy mix oriented towards converging inflation rates and interest 
rate management which targeted the exchange rate. 
The success of the EMS led European leaders to set up a Committee for the Study of 
Economic and Monetary Union in 1988. The Committee was chaired by the then Presi-
dent of the European Commission, Jacques Delors, and included central bank governors 
and other monetary experts. Their report, submitted in April 1989, defined the objective of 
a monetary union as a complete liberalisation of capital movements, full integration of 
financial markets, convertibility of currencies, irrevocable fixing of exchange rates, and 
the possible replacement of national currencies with a single currency. The report pointed 
out that this could be achieved in three stages, moving from closer economic and mone-
tary coordination to a single currency with an independent European Central Bank and 
rules to govern the size and financing of national budget deficits. The report's findings 
and proposals were incorporated in the Maastricht Treaty that laid the legal base for the 
creation of the EMU. 
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tion. While differences have to be taken into account, the European integration model 
can serve as a good point of reference for Asian efforts to make progress with regional 
economic and monetary integration. 
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